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On the fallibility of 
simulation models in 
informing pandemic 
responses
Authors’ reply
We welcome the correspondence 
from Deepti  Gurdasani  and 
Hisham Ziauddeen and agree that 
models that influence policy should 
be open to scrutiny, be informed 
by the best available evidence, and 
be constantly reviewed as more 
information and better estimates 
emerge. For these very reasons, we 
made the computer code needed 
to run the model available with the 
publication. This allows others to run 
the model using different parameter 
values when more information 
becomes available and explore the 
resulting effects. We are heartened 
to see that Gurdasani and Ziauddeen 
have done so.
In our Article,1 we evaluated one 
method through which countries 
could potentially control coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreaks 
due to seeding from imported cases: 
ascertaining the known contacts of 
symptomatic cases, tracing them, 
and isolating them upon symptom 
onset. We did not consider the effects 
of mass testing or untargeted testing 
within the wider community and drew 
no conclusions on their use.
Gurdasani and Ziauddeen quote a 
conclusion of our study, namely that 
achieving control using contact tracing 
and isolation alone was unlikely to 
bring the outbreak under control. 
Unfortunately, they did not include the 
second half of our paper’s concluding 
statement in their quote: “Rapid and 
effective contact tracing can reduce the 
initial number of cases, which would 
make the outbreak easier to control 
overall. Effective contact tracing and 
isolation could contribute to reducing 
the overall size of an outbreak or 
bringing it under control over a longer 
time period.” These conclusions do not 
promote the complete abandonment 
of case isolation and contact tracing 
efforts, as the authors suggest. 
Instead, they point to the long-term 
benefits of such measures in reducing 
overall transmission.
As Gurdasani and Ziauddeen note, 
the model parameter for the delay 
from onset to isolation plays a crucial 
role in determining the probability 
of controlling the outbreak within 
12 weeks. At least some of this delay 
will be mitigated by the speed at which 
testing can return results, and we agree 
that the availability of rapid tests with 
high sensitivity could play a key role 
here, as could other technologies. 
In the manuscript our short delay of 
3·4 days was based on empirical data 
of delay from onset to hospitalisation 
during the late stages of the 2003 
severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak in Hong Kong.2 Early 
studies of SARS coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) suggested similar delays; 
a delay of 4·6 days from onset to 
isolation was reported from symptom-
based surveillance in Shenzhen,3 and in 
Singapore the average delay from onset 
to isolation for local cases was 3 days 
by the end of February, 2020.4 Other 
new information has emerged about 
the natural history of SARS-CoV-2, 
suggesting our baseline assumption 
of 15% pre-symptomatic transmission 
was optimistic; one recent estimate 
suggests around 45% in the presence 
of active case-finding.5 We also 
assumed 0% or 10% of cases were 
subclinical, whereas newer studies 
suggest the percentage is higher.
We would advise the authors to 
be cautious about presenting the 
probability of controlling an outbreak 
as a standalone metric to describe 
the feasibility of contact tracing and 
isolation. Our model assumes that 
a health-care system has unlimited 
capacity to perform contact tracing but, 
as we show in figure 5 of the Article, 
some scenarios require the tracing of 
a considerable number of contacts per 
week. Governments and public health 
agencies will have to consider what scale 
of contact-tracing effort is logistically 
possible. In the USA, for example, an 
estimated 100 000 new contact-tracing 
workers would be needed to manage 
future COVID-19 epidemics.6
We agree with Gurdasani and 
Ziauddeen that there is a pressing need 
to disentangle the effectiveness of the 
varied responses to COVID-19 outbreaks 
around the world. As the authors state, 
the response in South Korea, which 
has so far managed to keep mortality 
low, involved a strong component of 
contact tracing and testing. However, 
in line with our original conclusion that 
this measure might not be sufficient 
to contain COVID-19 outbreaks on its 
own, many other strategies have been 
implemented in South Korea, including 
the closure of schools, kindergartens, 
community centres, and universities, 
and mandatory quarantines enforced by 
GPS-based mobile phone applications.7 
Nevertheless, we agree that contact 
tracing and isolation will probably play 
a major part in future strategies to 
combat the pandemic, and we firmly 
reject the notion that we recommended 
its abandonment.
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